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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
YOUNG FARMS LIMITED, a limited
partnership, PHILLIP 0. BOYER,
VIRGIL CONDON, BOYD J. FARR,
HOMER L. HALE, MARIE M. IRVINE,
G. KENNETH JOHNSON, KENNETH W.
JONES, ROBERT C. NEWMAN, TOFFIE
SAWAYA, RICHARD STOVER, WILLIAM
TINGEY, JAMES E. WATTS, RALPH M.
WRIGHT, limited partners,

APPELLANT'S REPLY BRIEF

Plaintiffs-Appellants,
-vsRICHTRON, INC., a Utah corporation,
and PAUL H. RICHINS; ARAL WESLEY
ALLREAD and SARAH ELAINE ALLRED,
his wife; BANK OF UTAH, a Utah
corporation,

Case No. 19902

Defendants,
LEO H. RICHINS,
Intervening Respondent.
REPLY TO INTERVENING RESPONDENT'S STATEMENT OF
DISPOSITION OF CASE BY LOWER COURT
Intervening respondent, in the last sentence of the first paragraph,
states that the issue of who was to be the general partner of the Young Farms
limited partnership was not adjudicated in this case but had been adjudicated
previously in another case.

The record indicates that the defendants filed a

counter claim in response to the original complaint (R. 18).

The first nine

paragraphs of the counter claim set forth a claim based upon the concept that
the defendant Richtron, Inc. is the only entity entitled to act as the plaintiff
Young Farms, Limited general partner.
The defendants1 answer and cross claim to the plaintiffs'
Amended Complaint (R. 274) fails to include a counter claim and there is no
claim that the limited partnership is being improperly represented, although
on their Fifth Defense the defendants claim lack of standing on behalf of the
individual plaintiffs.
At the end of the first pre-trial, defendant's counsel included
the question of whether or not Richtronfs resignation as a general partner
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gave plaintiff the right to substitute as general partner (R. 446), On the
31st day of October, 1983 the defendant Paul H. Richins submitted an Affidavit
(R. 521) including all of the arguments and documentation to support the arguments that he makes now in regard to whether or not the plaintiff limited
partnership can be represented by someone else other than the defendant Richtron,
Inc.

The defendant Paul H. Richins then made a Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff's

Motion for Partial Summary Judgment on the basis of the arguments made in his
Affidavit.

This was done on November 1, 1983 (R. 583). Defendant Richin's

Motion was denied and the Court granted Plaintiff's Motion for Partial Summary
Judgment (R. 584, 585).
The Court's ruling in regard to defendants Motion to Dismiss
Plaintiff's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment ajudicates the issue of whether
or not the plaintiff can be represented by someone other than Richtron, Inc..
However, this issue is not one that is material to the appeal by the plaintiffs
and the intervening respondent Leo Richins.
Leo Richins contention that the $10,431 that was deposited into
the Court as the 1980 payment on the real estate contract was deposited on
behalf of Paul H. Richins likewise doesn't stand up to a perusal of the record.
The original order requiring the deposit was entered on the 16th day of February,
1982 and required the defendants to deposit into the Court the sum of $10,431
which represents the 1980 payment on the Allred contract and the plaintiff was
to deposit a like sum into the Court, representing the 1981 Allred contract
payment (R« 234). The minute entry (R. 233) provided that Richtron was to
put the money in the Davis County Clerk's office.

If the defendant Richins

did not like the way the order was drafted and contended that he had no interest
in the contract, his counsel should have had the order read that only Richtron
was required to make the payment.

Instead, all other orders dealing with the

deposit (R. 317, 358, 359, 419, 445 and 453) deal with the Letter of Credit as
coming from both defendants.

In fact, the defendants Motion for an Order

Setting Aside and Vacating the Order Respecting the Collection of the Letter
of Credit (R. 459) claims that the order (R. 453) dated June 9, 1983 requiring
the payment should be set aside and vacated because the defendant Richtron, Inc.
had filed in bankruptcy and the Court did not have jurisdiction to require the
defendant Richtron, Inc. to provide the funds. This motion was denied (R« 487).
The Court granted the plaintiff's Motion for a Partial Summary
Judgment, dismissing the defendants Richtron, Inc. and Paul H. Richins as
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defendants and thereafter dealt with the question of the relationship between
the plaintiffs being the Young Farms limited partnership and the defendants
Allred being the owners of the limited partnership property.
The money was deposited in the Court not by Leo Richins but
was deposited in the Court by the defendants.

The fact that the Letter of

Credit was drawn on the account of Leo Richins has no materiality.

The Court

cannot go in back of the immediate transfer to determine who put up the money
or for what reasons.

The money was put in for the purpose of the 1980 payment.

The appellants were required to make that payment to the Allreds to keep the
contract viable (R. 660). The source from which the money came was the
defendants and not Leo Richins.

REPLY TO STATEMENT OF FACTS
In Intervening Respondent's Statement of Facts, Mr. Richins
spends a great deal of time on the proposition that Young Farms Limited has
no authority to bring the action and the appeal.

This issue is one between

the defendant Richtron, Inc. and the plaintiffs and was fully resolved by
the trial court, appealed from by the defendant Richtron, Inc., and their
appeal was later withdrawn and is not an issue in this appeal and Mr. Richins
has no standing to raise these issues on behalf of Richtron, Inc.
It is interesting that Mr. Richins brings in evidence that is
not a part of the record and which is immaterial to this case (see footnote
on p. 8 of Mr. Richins' brief).
The last part of the last sentence in the finishing paragraph
number 31 refers to $75,000 that was a liability of Young Farms to Richtron.
There was no evidence of a liability of Young Farms to Richtron.

In fact, as

pointed out earlier, the defendant Richtron did not file a counter claim against
the plaintiff Young Farms Limited.
Mr. Leo Richins spends a great deal of time in his Statement of
Facts pointing out that he was not a party, was not obligated to make any payments
in this lawsuit, that he did so on behalf of the defendant Paul H. Richins, his
son, and that his son had no interest in the property or any obligation to make
the payment, that he, Leo, had previously paid almost all of the 1980 payment
that was put into the escrow ($9,310.33 of it), for which he received an interest
in the contract, and yet he claims that he has an interest in the money paid.
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I can't see where it makes any difference if Mr. Leo Richins
provided the source from which the funds came.

The funds were placed into

the Court for the purpose of being the 1980 contract payment to the Allreds.
Once the defendants were dismissed out of the lawsuit, the funds should have
been maintained for that purpose and that purpose alone.
Mr. Paul Richins was the president of Richtron, Inc. Richtron,
Inc. had a fiduciary duty to see to it that the payment was made on the contract
as that money had been paid by the plaintiffs to make that payment.

The rela-

tionship between Leo Richins and his son in regard to the payment is immaterial
and the funds belong to the plaintiffs as they were required to make up the
payment to the Allreds in order to keep the real estate contract viable for the
limited partnership.

ARGUMENTS
REPLY TO ARGUMENT I
There is no question but what the Court's order was a final
order in regard to the 1980 payment and the money involved therein, nor was
there any necessity for any sworn statement from the plaintiffs in regard
to their claim for the $10,431.

This money was put into the Court as the

1980 payment on a contract that was being purchased by the plaintiffs.
They had the possessory right to the property and they had a legal right to
have the general partner protect their investment interests as the general
partner was their fiduciary agent in this regard.
The appeal was not taken until all of the issues were disposed
of in the case.

The issue in regard to the $10,431 was reserved and was

appealed after the final order of the Court.

REPLY TO ARGUMENT II
In response to Mr. Richins' argument that the appellant Young
Farms has no right to file or maintain this appeal, Mr. Leo Richins is not
the party that has any interest in this determination.

This right would only

relate to Richtron, Inc. and Mr. Richins is not representing Richtron, Inc. in
any sense of the word and the defendant Richtron, Inc. has not filed a brief
as leave was given them to do by this Sourt.
There is no question that the District Court has the right to
determine the relationship and rights of the parties and this matter is res
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judicata; this issue was determined judicially by the lower court and that
determination was appealed by the defendants Richtron, Inc. and Paul Richins,
and their appeal was withdrawn (R. 598, 605, 675, 676), and the question of
appellant Young Farms' right to maintain this appeal is res judicata.

REPLY TO ARGUMENT III
It is interesting that Mr. Leo Richins would make this argument
which basically supports the appellants1 position in regard to the Blackfoot
Farms case.

Richtron, Inc. and Paul Richins were parties to this action.

They were dismissed out of the action.

If you follow Mr. Richins f argument

to its logical conclusion, the monies that were deposited in the Court would
then belong to the remaining parties, i.e., the plaintiffs and7or defendants
Allreds, which is exactly the point the plaintiffs are making.
If Mr. Leo Richins had wanted to be a party, he should have
made an effort to become one in the District Court.

If he thought he had an

interest in the money, he should have made an effort to protect his interest
in the District Court.

If the defendants had wanted to present arguments and/or

be heard, they could have done so.

The plaintiffs made a motion to reinstate

Mr. Paul Richins as a party and to try the case as a whole (see pages 4 through
8 of the transcript).

Mr. Richins objected to plaintiffs' motion to reinstate

the defendants into the action.

REPLY TO ARGUMENT IV
Mr. Leo Richins in this argument fails to recognize that what
the lower court did in this action was conduct an accounting of the rights of
the parties to the limited partnership's assets and rule that the limited
partnership's assets belonged to the limited partnership and that the defendants
Richtron, Inc. and Paul Richins had no interest therein and that, upon payment
of the outstanding obligations on the contract of sale to the Allreds, that
contract was reinstated in the name of the Young Farms Limited and not in the
name of Richtron, Inc.
This argument is moot as the general partner and its president
were previously dismissed out of the action and the rights of the parties were
determined by the Court, appealed from, and their appeal withdrawn.
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The $10,431 was deposited, without question, for the purpose
of being the 1980 payment on the real estate contract, which represented the
real estate which comprised the assets of the limited partnership.

Who has

a better right to the limited partnership assets than the limited partnership
and its limited partners?

The Court makes that determination and the defen-

dants objected to that determination and appealed that ruling and later
withdrew their appeal.

That ought to make the issue moot.

A review of the record, in particular the final order (R. 678),
can lead to no other conclusion but that the Court determined the rights of
the parties in regard to the limited partnership property and made a final
accounting in regard to that property and the rights of the parties to it.

REPLY TO ARGUMENT V
1 canTt understand how, if Mr. Paul Richins has no liability
for any of Richtron Inc.'s obligations, he would have been so willing to put
$10,431 into the Court. He was represented by competent counsel at the time.
If he objected to the placing of the money into Court, he should have made
the objection known and/or changed the order.

He was certainly aware that

the purpose for the $10,431 was the 1980 payment which he, as the president
of Richtron, Inc,, withdrew from the escrow account, knowing that there were
no funds to replace it.
I fail to see where this argument has any materiality to the
question of Mr. Leo Richins' right to the money.

Mr. Leo Richins didn't put

the money into the Court, Mr. Paul Richins did.

Mr. Leo Richins provided the

money to his son, Paul Richins, and I don't believe the reasons for his
providing those funds have any materiality whatsoever as to what those funds
were to be used for or placed in the Court for.

They were placed into the

Court for the purpose of paying the 1980 payment on the Allred contract.
There is absolutely no question at all about that fact. Whether the funds
were paid by Paul Richins mistakenly or by his father to Paul and then to
the Court makes no difference.

REPLY TO ARGUMENT VI
TT

The initial 'Order to Compel Deposit' signed by Judge J.

Duffy Palmer (R. 234) required Richtron and Paul Richins to deposit $10,431
into Court, representing the 1980 payment on the Allred contract, to be held
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'PENDING THE DETERMINATION OF THE RIGHTS OF THE PARTIES IN THE ALLRED CONTRACT
AND THE PROPERTIES UNDERLYING SAID CONTRACT.r"

(p. 39 of Brief of Intervenor.)

The Court determined the rights of the parties in the Allred contract.

The

Court determined that the Young Farms Limited, the limited partnership, had
the right, upon the payment of the delinquent payments, of which the 1980
$10,431 was one, to be put in the place of defendant Richtron, Inc. as the
purchaser of the property covered by the Allred contract.

The Court made

the determination that the defendants Paul Richins and Richtron, Inc. had
no interest in that property.
results of this lawsuit.

There can be no other interpretation of the

The Court's ruling that the Court would go in back

of the initial deposit to determine where the money came from and award the
money to that party, Mr. Leo Richins, who is not a party to the lawsuit, is
in error and that error should be cured by this appeal.

REPLY TO ARGUMENTS VII AND VIII
In reply to arguments VII and VIII, it makes no difference why
Leo Richins deposited the Letter of Credit.

The Letter of Credit was the same

as cash and no consideration was required for it.

It was deposited for the

purpose of paying the 1980 payment on the Allred contract.

The fact that it

was contributed by Mr. Leo Richins does not make it his property.

It was

deposited to replace a payment that was made by the defendant Richtron, Inc.
on behalf of and with the funds that should have been from the plaintiff
limited partnership.

The question of where cash comes from to make a payment

required by the Court under the contract is immaterial.

This Court should

look at what the purpose was for which the money was deposited.

It was

deposited, without question, as the 1980 payment on the Allred contract
covering the limited partnership's real property.

CONCLUSION
The $10,431 was to be the 1980 payment.

It was paid by

the limited partnership to the general partner for that purpose and it
was later required that the limited partnership pay it again in order to
maintain its property rights. The limited partnership should have the right
to recover this payment.
DATED this 16th day of January, 1985.

SEPH S. £N0WLT0N

MAILING CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that,I have this 16th day of January, 1985
mailed zk^true and correct copy, postage prepaid, of the foregoing
Appellants' Reply Brief to Leo H. Richins, Pro Se, Intervening
Respondent, 141 East 100 South, Kaysville, Utah 84037; and John T.
Anderson, Attorney for Defendant Richtron, Inc., Hansen Jones Maycock
& Leta, 50 West Broadway, Salt Lake City, Utah 84101.
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